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NOTE
THE COLD DECISION OF
COLDWELL BANKER:
A CALIFORNIA COURT ENDS
THE EVOLUTION OF BROKER
LIABILITY WITH ONE DECISION
INTRODUCTION

A woman planning to purchase a home speaks to the
seller's broker to help her decide whether to purchase the
house. The seller's broker tells her that the home is in excellent condition. Relying on the broker's representations, the
woman buys the house. Some time later, the woman notices a
moldy smell in the kitchen and downstairs bathroom. An environmental test shows a dangerous level of mycotoxins and mold
spores. The mold exposure causes the woman to become extremely sick, developing a case of asthma. The broker failed to
adequately inspect the home for possible defects and failed to
disclose known or reasonably ascertainable defects in the property.
Because a buyer relies on a broker's representations
when purchasing a house, there is a duty of honesty and trust
between the two. The broker's duty of care to the woman is
readily apparent. Since the broker owes the woman a duty of
care, if the other elements are proven, the broker is liable to
the woman for misrepresentation, fraud, and negligence. 1
See 6 B.E. Witkin, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS §§ 677, 732 at 60 (9th
ed. 1990); see also Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387 (1984) (discussing
that the law requires a broker to disclose to a buyer material defects known to the
1
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But what happens when the individual who becomes sick
and develops asthma is the purchaser's minor son? Does the
broker's duty of care extend to the minor child living with the
mother/purchaser? According to a recent California decision,
Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company, Inc. u. Superior Court, the broker owes no duty to a purchaser's child. 2
In Coldwell Banker, the buyer's son, Marcos, developed
asthma and other illnesses from exposure to mold. 3 The seller's
broker failed to disclose the mold, which was either a known or
a reasonably ascertainable defect.' Marcos sued the brokerage
company, Coldwell Banker, for negligence, nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional stress, fraud, and misrepresentation. 6 The court found for Coldwell Banker on all counts, holding that since Marcos was not the actual buyer, the broker had
no duty of care to him." The court opined that extending the
duty to Marcos would create unlimited exposure to liability for
a broker to anyone who could foreseeably be harmed in a
buyer's house.
California has been at the forefront of modern changes in
the law, including the expansion of the duty of disclosure. 8
However, this expansion stopped with Coldwell Banker. The
holding in Coldwell Banker, that a broker's duty does not extend to the purchaser's minor child, may result in a domino
effect of inequitable, cold-hearted decisions. 9 The effect of these
decisions will insulate brokers from future lawsuits, even when
they are directly responsible for the injuries of others. In order
to create more incentive for brokers to disclose all material
facts, the court should have analyzed this case under a more
relaxed standard.
Coldwell Banker may also have a detrimental effect on
persons injured by mold. Mold litigation is already complex,
and the medical results are often ambiguous as to illnesses
7

broker but unknown to and unobservable by the buyer, and if that broker fails to do so,
they may be liable for misrepresentation, fraud, or negligence).
2 Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company, Inc. v. Superior Court, 11
Cal. Rptr. 3d. 564 (2004).
• [d. at 567.
• [d.
• [d. at 567-68.
6 [d. at 570.
7 [d. at 57l.
8 See infra Part (I)(B) California and Disclosure.
• [d. at 570.
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mold may cause. IO This case adds another hurdle for injured
individuals. Depending on the circumstances, they might not
have anyone to bring a claim against, even when a broker is
clearly at fault for failing to disclose a known defect in the
home. Expanding a broker's duty of care to minor children of a
purchaser would ensure that at least a minor foreseeably living
in a home will have a cause of action against a negligent broker.
Part I of this note focuses on the history of the broker's
duty of disclosure and duties owed to third persons.l1 That part
provides a historical framework of the evolving law in broker
disclosure and the broker's duty to third persons, concentrating
mainly on California law. Part II discusses the broker disclosure statute and the downfall of its narrow interpretation. 12
Part III discusses the common-law balancing test, and the
benefits of its application to the Coldwell Banker case and
other cases like it. 13 Finally, Part IV concludes that the court in
Coldwell Banker erred by taking a narrow interpretation of the
statute to establish the broker's duty to third persons, and that
it should instead have used the common-law balancing test to
establish duty.14
I.

BROKERS AND THIRD PERSONS

A.

COMMON-LAW DISCLOSURE AND THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT
EMPTOR

In a typical real estate transaction, a seller hires a broker
who locates a prospective buyer to purchase the property. This
transaction creates a fiduciary relationship between the seller
and the seller's broker. 15 A fiduciary relationship begins when
"a special confidence [is] reposed in one who in equity and good
conscience is bound to act in good faith, and with due regard to

10 See Thelma Jarman-Felstiner, Comment, Mold Is Gold: But, Will It Be The
Next Asbestos?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 529, 541 (2003).
11 See infra notes 15-86 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 97-153 and accompanying text.
'4 See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
'" CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.16 (West 2005).
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the interests of the one reposing the confidence. m6 The doctrine
of caveat emptor, better known as "let the buyer beware" denied
the existence of a fiduciary duty between the purchaser and the
seller's broker in a real property transaction. '7 Therefore, when
operating under the doctrine of caveat emptor, the seller and
his or her agent has no affirmative duty to inspect or disclose
defects in the property.18
The principle of caveat emptor assumes that each party
has equal access to the underlying facts forming the basis of
the transaction!· Historically, a real property owner exchanged property with well-acquainted neighbors. 20 The sale of
such property took place by simple face-to-face transactions;
the parties were "familiar with the condition of property being
exchanged, the competence of its builder, and the quality of its
maintenance and renovation.rn, This is not the case in modern
society. With the post-World War II population growth, a rapidly growing middle class began to move more and more. 22 This
created the need for the mass production of homes. 23 With
modern mass development and people moving all across the
country, the buyer has less bargaining power then the buildervendor because the buyer does not have the same access to
facts about the property.24
The increase in vendor bargaining power increased the
possibility of many unfair real estate transactions. 25 Sellers
and their agents had the ability to sell defective property by
simply not informing potential buyers about substantial defects
on the property, and thereafter sellers and their agents would

16 Vogel v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 801 S.W.2d 746, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(citations omitted).
17 Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 112 (1884); Robert M. Zeit, Real
Estate--Broker Liability To Purchasers--Herbert V. Saffell, 877 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1989),
63 TEMP. L. REV. 165, 165 (1990).
18 Id.
19 Ronald Basso, Note, Reed v. King: Fraudulent Nondisclosure of a Multiple
Murder in a Real Estate Transaction, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 877, 885-86 (1984).
20 Alan M. Weinberger, Let The Buyer Be Well Informed?--Doubting The Demise
Of Caveat Emptor, 55 MD. L. REV. 387, 392 (1996).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 395.
"J3 Id.
24 Megan Peterson, Note, Seller Beware: Mandatory Disclosure Provisions in
Iowa Put Sellers of Residential Real Estate on Alert, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 569,573 (2002) .
.. Kirk v. Ridgway, 373 N.W.2d 491, 493 (Iowa 1985).
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have no liability to buyers. 26 Homebuyers became bound by
uninformed decisions regarding the condition of their newly
purchased homes. 27 Consequently, courts began to recognize
special relationships of trust between the parties, including the
real estate broker. 28 Thus, to circumvent the harsh doctrine of
caveat emptor, the courts recognized that this special relationship imposed on the seller and broker an implied warranty of
habitability.29 Accordingly, a buyer now has a means of recourse when latent defects in a home interfere with the reasonable expectation that the home is fit for habitation. 30

B.

CALIFORNIA AND DISCLOSURE

California has come a long way since the days of caveat
emptor. Rather than conditioning disclosure on an implied
warranty of habitability, California took a more aggressive approach by expanding the scope of the duty of a seller and broker to disclose material facts affecting the property to a prospective buyer. 31 The California case of Lingsch v. Savage ignited California's movement toward this end. 32 In Lingsch, a
vendor and his broker failed to disclose to the purchasers that
the building was in a state of disrepair, that units in the building were illegal, and that the building had been condemned by
city officials. 33 The California court found that, '~here the
seller [or broker] knows of facts materially affecting the value
or desirability of the property and also knows that such facts
are not known to, or within the reach of the diligent attention
26 [d., see also Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition Disclosure
Legislation, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 381, 387 (1995) (reviewing obligations imposed on a
seller at common law).
'l7 Kirk, 373 N.W.2d. at 493-94.
28 ARTHUR R. GAUDIO, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAw § 293-4 at 346-52 (1987 &
Supp. 1994) (discussing fiduciary duties the broker has toward buyers).
29 See generally Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Collins, 794 P.2d 936, 177
(Alaska 1990); Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 678 P.2d 427, 430 (Ariz. 1984);
Coney v. Stewart, 562 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Ark. 1978); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co.,
525 P.2d 88, 91 (Cal. 1974); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399, 408 (Colo. 1964);
Vernali v. Centrella, 266 A.2d 200, 201-02 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1970); Smith v. Berwin
Builders Inc., 287 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972).
30 Board of Directors of Bloomfield Club Recreation Ass'n v. Hoffman Group, Inc.,
712 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ill. 1999).
31 Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (1963).
32 [d. at 201-10.
33 [d. at 203.
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and observation of the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer."34 Thus, Lingsch opened the door to an
extension of liability for fraud to a broker who intentionally
failed to disclose a material defect of the property to the buyer.
California continued to expand the broker's duty of disclosure even further in the 1984 landmark case, Easton v. Strassburger."" In Easton, the court imposed an obligation upon brokers to diligently inspect properties offered for sale."" As in
Lingsch, a broker must disclose to prospective purchasers all
material facts determined from an inspection that affects the
value or desirability of the property.37 Easton differs from
Lingsch, however, in that the plaintiff purchaser based his action on simple negligence, not intentional misrepresentation.""
The important distinction between the two theories of liability, negligence and intentional misrepresentation, relates to
the intent of the parties. Intentional misrepresentation requires one to "willfully deceive another with intent to induce
him to alter his position to his injury or risk. m9 In contrast, the
general negligence theory does not require proof that the defendant willfully caused harm or injury to the other:o "Negligence is either the failure to do something that an ordinarily
prudent person would do under given circumstances or the doing of something that an ordinarily prudent person would not
do under those circumstances."41 By making brokers liable for
negligence involving nondisclosure, the Easton court exposed
brokers to increased liability.
In response to Easton, the California legislature added two
articles to the Civil Code: California Civil Code sections 11021102.15: Disclosures Upon Transfer of Residential Property,
(hereinafter Transfer Article) and California Civil Code sections 2079-2079.10: Duty to Prospective Purchaser of Residen[d. at 204.
Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
36 [d. at 388.
37 [d.
38 [d. at 387.
39 CAL. Crv. CODE § 1709 (West 2005) [emphasis added]; see also Maddux v.
Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (discussing the
elements of fraud).
40 Nancy Hersh & Ward Smith, Prima Facie Case of Negiigence, CAL. Crv. PRAC.
TORTS § 1:1 (2004); see also B.E. Witkin, 6 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA L., TORTS § 729
(9th ed.) (discussing the meaning of negligence).
41 [d.
34

35
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tial Property (hereinafter Broker Article)." Both articles apply
to sales and value-related transfers of residential real property
or residential stock cooperatives containing fewer than four
dwelling units:a The Transfer Article requires the seller, or
other transferor subject to the statute, as well as any broker
involved in the transaction, to obtain and timely deliver a disclosure statement in the prescribed form." The Broker Article,
on the other hand, applies only to sales and transfers involving
a licensed real estate broker:· The Broker Article imposes upon
brokers a duty "to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent
visual inspection of the property offered for sale and to disclose
to that prospective purchaser all facts materially affecting the
value or desirability of the property that such an inspection
would reveal. »46
Twenty two years after the groundbreaking case of Lingsch
v. Savage, the enactment of the above statutes showed the evolution of California's law and its imposition of the most stringent duty of disclosure upon brokers. California took the first
step to make sure brokers satisfy these duties by codifying the
common-law doctrine that mandates broker disclosure to the
buyer. 47 A few years after the enactment of the California statutes, sixteen other states passed their own legislation to require more disclosure in real estate transactions:a In contrast
to California law, the laws of most of these states applied to the
42 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102-1102.15 and CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2079-2079.10.
See
legislative history at Section 4 of Stats. 1985, c. 223 ("It is the intent of the Legislature
that this act codify and make precise the holding in Easton v. Strassburger (152 Cal.
App. 3d 90)").
43 §§ 1102-1102.15; §§ 2079-2079.10 .
.. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102.2, 1102.6, and 1102.12.
'" CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079. For the full text of this statute, see infra note 79 .
.. [d.

" [d.
48 For a detailed discussion, see Washburn at 381.
These states include
Maine(Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §§ 13001-13251 (West 1988 & Supp 1993)), Virginia
(Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-517-55-525 (Michie Supp. 1994)), New Hampshire (N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 477:4-c (Supp. 1993)), Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 709.01-709.08 (West
Supp. 1994), Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 324.360 (Michie 1994))., Alaska (Alaska
Stat. §§ 34.70.010-.70.200 (Supp. 1993)), Delaware (Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 2570-2578
(1993)), Illinois (S.H.A. 765 ILCS 77/1-77/99 (Supp. 1994)), Indiana (Ind. Code Ann. §§
24-4.6-2 - 24-4.6-2-13 (West 1994)), Iowa (Iowa Code Ann. §§ 558A.1-558A.8 (1992 and
Supp. 1994)), Maryland (MD. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 10-702 (Supp. 1993)), Michigan
(Mich. Stat. Ann. § 26.1286(51)-(66) (Callaghan Supp 19943), Mississippi (Miss. Code.
Ann. §§ 89-1-501 - 89-1-523 (Supp. 1993)), Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5302.30
(Anderson Supp. 1993)), Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws. §§ 5-20.8-1 - 5-20.8-10 (Supp.
1993), and South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 43-4-37 - 43-4-44 (Supp. 1994).
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seller and not the broker.'· Despite variation in these provisions, the legislatures of these sixteen states enacted statutes
that were narrow versions of the California Disclosure Act:o
Although these states followed the trend of California's Transfer Article, most of them refrained from enacting anything
similar to California's Broker Article. 51
California pioneered the expansion of a broker's duties of
disclosure to the buyer by way of case law and statute. California has recognized a special relationship of trust between
the seller's broker and the future purchaser. 52 Based on this
relationship, California imposed a duty to inspect and disclose
any material defect to the property.53 Although California has
taken a stance to protect the buyer, the state has failed to extend that protection to third persons in a real estate transaction:'
C.

DUTY OWED TO THIRD PERSONS

"As a general rule, any person who performs professional
services owes a duty of care to all third persons within the area

•• For example, in Virginia, the legislature mandated 'disclosure for all sales and
related transfers for value of residential real property of four or fewer units whether or
not a real estate broker is involved. Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-517-55-525 (Michie Supp.
1994). The difference is that the disclosure falls solely on the owner. [d. § 55-519(1).
Moreover, the Virginia statute specifically stated, "The disclosure form shall also contain a notice to purchasers that the information contained in the disclosure is the representations of the owner and is not the representations of the broker or salesperson, if
any." [d. § 55-519(2) In Alaska, the legislature came up with a similar Act to that of
California, mandating that the seller, instead of the broker, complete and deliver to
any prospective purchaser a disclosure statement in a form to be established by the
state's real estate commission. Alaska Stat. §§ 34.70.010-.70.200 (1993). The remedy
provided by this statute offers actual damages to the purchaser for negligent violation
of the statute. [d. § 34.70.090(b). If the violation is willful, the purchaser may recover
up to three times the actual damages. [d. § 34.70.090(c). Both of these statutes remain
unchanged as of 2005.
50 Washburn at 431.
51 See supra notes 50 and 51. Although most of these are narrow versions of the
CAL. CIV. CODE section 2079, Maine has enacted a statute that is very similar to California's. There, the broker must disclose material defects on the property that they
know of, or reasonably should know of. 32 M.R.S.A. § 13273(2)(a) (West 2005).
52 GAUDIO, supra note 30, at 356-62.
53 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079 (West 2005).
54 See Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company, Inc. v. Superior Court,
11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 564 (2004).
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of foreseeable risk.""" In a real estate transaction, the seller's
agent owes a duty of care to the buyer to act reasonably to prevent a risk of injury to the buyer. 56 The agent's duty owed to
third persons, however, depends on which liability theory is
used; a broker may be subject to liability on the basis of either
negligence or negligent misrepresentation. 57 To determine the
extent of the broker's duty of care, California courts use a twopronged analysis. 58 First, courts examine "whether a reasonable person would have foreseen an unreasonable risk of harm
to the third person.""· Secondly, in view of such risk, the courts
analyze whether "the broker exercised ordinary care under the
circumstances. "60
Norman 1. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker
demonstrates one criterion for establishing a duty of care:' In
Norman 1. Krug, the court found a broker negligent for failing
to disclose the existence of an unrecorded interest to a prospective buyer or to inform the interest holder of impending sale,
even though the interest holder had been informed of a previous potential sale. 62 The court examined the broker's duty of
care to a third person by weighing a number of factors: 3 These
factors included (1) the foreseeability of harm, (2) the degree of
certainty that the third party was injured, (3) "the closeness of
the connection between the broker's conduct and the injury suffered," (4) "the moral blame attached to the broker's conduct,"

50 Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL
ESTATE § 3:45 (3d ed. 2004); see also Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v.
Praszker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1990) (citing text).
06 Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL
ESTATE §§ 3:43, 3:45 (3d ed. 2004).
57 Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL
ESTATE § 3:45 (3d ed. 2004).
06 Norman 1. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 228,
231 (1990); see Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA
REAL ESTATE § 3:45 (3d ed. 2004); B. E. WITKIN, 6 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
TORTS §§ 750-760 (9th ed. 1990).
5. Id.
60 Id.
61 Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 228,
(1990).
62 Id. at 229-30 and 232.
63 Id. at 231.
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(5) the prevention of future harm, and (6) the extent to which
the transaction is intended to affect the third party.6.
This method of analysis has been utilized in many different contexts."s Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, a
premises liability case, represents one example of how the balancing test has been utilized in a wide variety of liability
claims. 66 Premises liability cases use a similar balancing
method to establish duty.67 In Ann M., the court used a balancing test to establish whether a business proprietor has a duty
to protect customers from the criminal acts of others.68 This
balancing test weighs the burden of imposing a duty to protect
against the criminal acts of third persons against the foreseeability of harm. 69 Many courts have chosen to follow the same
rule and rationale set forth in Ann M. to establish duty!O
In the context of analyzing a broker's duty to third persons, however, the California courts have neglected to use a
balancing test similar to those applied in Ann M. and Norman
1. Krug.71 For example, the court in Easton found that a real
estate broker who represented the vendor had an affirmative
duty to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection
of the residential property listed for sale.72 From that search,
the broker then needed to disclose to prospective purchasers all
facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that such an investigation would revea1. 73 In this ruling,
the court limited its decision to prospective purchasers and did

.. Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 228,
231 (1990); see also Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA
REAL ESTATE § 3:45 (3d ed. 2004).
65 Contexts in which the balancing test has been applied include third-party
liability claims dealing with lessees and contractors, J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d
60 (1979), beneficiaries of a will and lawyers, Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (1961), and
manufacturers and carriers, North American Chemical Co. v. Superior Court, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 466 (1997).
66 Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 863 P.2d 207 (1993).
67 [d. at 215.
68

59

[d.
[d.

70 See Pamela W. v. Millsom, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 695-96 (1994); Sharon P. v.
Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121, 126 (1999).
71 Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984); Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company, Inc. v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 564 (2004).
72 Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
73 [d., (emphasis added).
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not include third party liability in its analysis. A year later,
that rule was codified in California Civil Code section 2079. 75
In 2004, the court applied section 2079 in Coldwell
Banker. 76 In that case, after a minor's mother purchased a
house, the child developed asthma caused by toxic mold in the
house. 77 The minor brought many causes of action against the
real estate broker. 78 The court concluded that the statutory
inspection and disclosure duties of residential real estate brokers did not impose on the broker a duty of care toward the
minor child. 79 The court reasoned that from "the clear and unambiguous language of section 2079, the inspection and disclosure duties of residential real estate brokers and their agents
apply exclusively to prospective buyers, and not to other persons who are not parties to the real estate transaction."80 Although the mold caused harm to a minor child who was an occupant of the purchased home, and this harm was a likely result of the broker's lack of disclosure, that child has no cause of
action against the broker. 81
The court in Coldwell Banker refused to impose liability on
brokers for failure to disclose material defects to third persons. 82 The court rejected the traditional rule that a broker
owes a duty to all foreseeable third persons, believing that
"foreseeability is not a substitute for legal duty."B3 Moreover,
the court has ignored the many other possible bases to establish duty on a broker, in particular, the balancing test utilized
74

[d.
75 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079 (West 2005).
Section (a) of the California Civil Code
section 2079 provides: "(a) It is the duty of a real estate broker or salesperson, licensed
under Division 4 (commencing with Section 10000) of the Business and Professions
Code, to a prospective purchaser of residential real property comprising one to four
dwelling units, or a manufactured home as defined in Section 18007 of the Health and
Safety Code, to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of the
property offered for sale and to disclose to that prospective purchaser all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that an investigation would reveal, if that broker has a written contract with the seller to find or obtain a buyer or is
a broker who acts in cooperation with that broker to find and obtain a buyer."
76 Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 3d. 564,569-70 (2004).
77 [d. at 567.
78 [d.
78 [d. at 570.
'" [d. at 569
81 [d. at 564-73.
82 [d.
83 [d. at 571.
7.
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in Norman I. Krug or Ann M.8' By utilizing a strict statutory
framework to establish a broker's duty, the court narrowed a
broker's liability only to prospective purchasers. 85 Consequently, Coldwell Banker found that this duty extends merely
to the actual buyer, and not the buyer's minor child living in
the purchased home.86

II.

THE ROLE OF THE STATUTE AND DEFINING THE DUTY OF

CARE

The Coldwell Banker court should have used a commonlaw balancing test to establish the broker's duty to third persons, thereby possibly extending the broker's duty to a purchaser's minor child. Instead, the court followed a narrow
reading of the statute and thereby rejected the idea of extending the broker's duty of inspection and disclosure to the purchaser's minor child.
The court concluded that the broker
owed a duty only to the actual purchaser. Although this is in
accord with the statutory language, the court ignored the reason for the steady increase in the need for disclosure. 89 The
reason for the increase in broker disclosure can be drawn from
an analysis of the legislative intent of California Civil Code
section 2079. The purpose of the statute was to codify the holding in the Easton case. 90 Further, the provisions of the act are
to be interpreted as "a defmition of the duty of care found to
exist by Easton v. Strassburger, and the manner of its discharge.»91 It can be logically inferred that the reasoning behind
the Easton court's decision is part of the reason that the Legislature codified the holding in the first place. The Easton court
87

88

84 Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 228,
231 (1990); Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 863 P.2d 207 (1993).
85 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 569-70.
See CAL. CN. CODE § 2079
(West 2005).
86 Id. at 570.
87 Id. at 564-73.
88 Id.
89 § 2079. The statute reads: a broker must "conduct a reasonably competent and
diligent visual inspection of the property offered for sale and to disclose to that prospective purchaser all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property
that an investigation would reveal." (emphasis added).
90 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2709 (West 2005); Section 4 of Stats. 1985, c. 223 ("It is the
intent of the Legislature that this act codify and make precise the holding in Easton v.
Strassburger. ").
91 Id.
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came to its decision in order to protect buyers from unscrupulous brokers deceiving them into believing they are obtaining
habitable properties when in fact they are tainted with defects. 9o Because brokers similar to the one in Coldwell Banker
are shielded from liability, allowing minor children of the purchaser to remain remediless does not achieve the legislative
intent.
As said in Easton, "[t]he primary purposes of the [Lingsch]
rule are to protect the buyer from the unethical broker and
seller and to insure that the buyer is provided sufficient accurate information to make an informed decision whether to purchase. "93 Although the court's reasoning is to make sure the
buyer is well informed in making the purchase, it is reasonably
apparent that the court also intended to protect buyers from
unethical brokers. Protecting the buyer from an unethical broker not only includes protection from financial hazards, but
from health hazards as well. It is a hard-hearted thought to
believe the courts are only concerned with a buyer's economic
injuries and not with their health injuries. A minor child living
in the purchaser's home is exposed to all the same dangers as
the purchaser in that home. Therefore, it is reasonable to protect that child from the same health injuries that may occur
from defects in that home.
Furthermore, the Legislature included section 2079.24 of
the California Civil Code, which proclaims "nothing in- this article shall be construed . . . to relieve agents . . . from liability
for their conduct in connection with acts governed by this article or for any breach of a fiduciary duty or a duty of disclosure. "94 Here, the statute is keeping with the evolution of broker liability by adding protection to purchasers from unscrupulous brokers without relieving brokers from any other liability.
In other words, the Legislature is making sure that the effect of
the article is to expand the broker's duty to purchaser, not to
shield them from the kind of liability that brokers have been
exposed to in the past. Since brokers have been liable for failEaston, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388; Original wording in the brackets was "Cooper·
Lingsch." Cooper refers to a case in 1974 that followed the ruling in Lingsch to find a
sales agent had a duty to the purchaser. Cooper v. Jevne, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727
(1976).
94 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2709.24 (West 2005)
92

93
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ure to disclose to third persons before this statute, liability to
third persons should survive this statute."5 Thus, the commonlaw balancing test should have been used to establish the broker's duty to Marcos.
Unfortunately, instead ofutili";;.ng the common-law balancing test to establish duty, the court in Coldwell Banker saw the
narrow wording of the statute as the only basis for finding
duty."· This result rejected the notion of extending the disclosure and inspection duties to any third person. Thereby, the
court closed off any opportunity in the future for any minor
child of a home purchaser to make a reasonable claim against a
broker. For example, a minor child foreseeably living in a
house would have a reasonable claim against a broker under a
balancing test, but if the court follows the narrow reading of
the statute, the child is left without a cause of action. By following the statute, the court leaves injured children with no
recourse in the law against the broker who is responsible for
the injury. By using the common-law balancing test to establish duty for third persons, the court might have come to a
more equitable result.

III.

THE BALANCING TEST AND ESTABLISHING A BROKER'S
DUTY

According to Coldwell Banker, a broker's duty of care only
extends to a purchaser."7 The Coldwell Banker Court based its
decision on a strict reading of California Civil Code section
2079 and case law."· The court, however, did not have to restrict itself to the narrow wording of the statute. The court
may have opted to take a broader approach. It could have included the purchaser's minor children in the broker's duty of
care analysis. It is a logical extension of the duty, especially
since a minor child is dependant on the parent for shelter, and
.. Norman L Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker, 269 CaL Rptr. 228,
231 (1990); see Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA
REAL ESTATE § 3:45 (3d ed. 2004); B. E. WITKIN, 6 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
TORTS §§ 750-760 (9th ed. 1990). Discussed supra at notes 56-65 .
.. Coldwell Banker, 11 CaL Rptr. 3d. at 564-73.
97 Id.
.. One of these cases is FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 CaL Rptr. 2d
404 (1995). In that case, the liability did not extend to social guests because they were
not intended beneficiaries. This case and the other cases used in Coldwell Banker are
discussed infra in notes 135-153 and accompanying text.
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therefore suffers the same consequences if a home is inhabitable. Instead, the court established a bright-line rule of whom
the broker is liable. But the legislative intent was not to
minimize the broker's liability to the buyer only. It was to codify the holding in Easton, which established negligence as a
viable cause of action against a broker, thereby expanding the
duty of disclosure to buyers.99 The Easton decision continued
the evolution of broker liability. The court in Coldwell Banker
ended that evolution abruptly with its decision to shield brokers from third party liability.
The court missed its chance to continue in the progression
of broker liability and the opportunity to protect buyers and
their children from unscrupulous brokers. Instead, they concentrated more on the policy to protect brokers from overexposure to lawsuits. loo Due to the extreme circumstances of the
case, the court should have gone through a balancing analysis
to see if a buyer's child, who lives in the home, deserves a duty
of care from the broker.
The Coldwell Banker court took a narrow view of the statute to identify the persons to whom the duty is owed. lol However, there are many factors that establish a duty that the
court failed to consider. Whether a broker owes a duty of care
to third persons in any specific situation is a question of law
determined by weighing many factors. 102 These factors include
(1) the foreseeability of harm, (2) the degree of certainty that
the third party was injured, (3) "the closeness of the connection
between the broker's conduct and the injury suffered," (4) "the
moral blame attached to the broker's conduct," (5) the prevention of future harm, and (6) the extent to which the transaction
is intended to affect the third party. 103 With an analysis of
these criteria, the court would have found that the broker had
a duty to the child.

99 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2709 (West 2005); Section 4 of Stats. 1985, c. 223 ("It is the
intent of the Legislature that this act codify and make precise the holding in Easton v.
Strassburger."); Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387 (1984).
100 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 571.
101 [d. at 569-70.
102 Krug, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 230-31, discussed supra at notes 62-65.
103 [d.
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A. THE FORESEEABILITY OF HARM
As the court mentioned in Norman 1. Krug, "[t]he most im-

portant step in determining if a broker owes a duty of care to a
third party is to examine 'whether a reasonable person would
have foreseen an unreasonable risk of harm to the third person
and whether in view of such risk the broker exercised ordinary
care under the circumstances.'"'o, In Coldwell Banker, the court
rejected the foreseeability argument. I05 It did not find that
harm to Marcos was not foreseeable. I06 The court instead devalued the foreseeability argument in this context and made it
inapplicable. 107
The court mentioned that "foreseeability is not a substitute
for legal duty. Rather, foreseeability of harm is merely one factor to be considered in imposing negligence liability."108 Therefore, the court seemed to suggest that foreseeability, by itself, is
not enough to impose a duty.109 Here, the court only looked at
two of the six factors: the foreseeability of the harm and the
extent that the transaction was intended to affect the third
party. 110 Although the Court mentioned that foreseeability
alone cannot establish duty, it failed to analyze the other factors that are used to establish duty.1II By weighing the rest of
the factors, the court might have come to a more equitable result.
After discussing only these two elements, the court disposed of the foreseeability argument on public policy grounds. 112
The court feared that expanding the duty to nonparties to the
transaction would expose the broker to infinite liability.1I3 In a
footnote, the court stated it was afraid that a decision expanding the duty to non parties to the transaction would place professional liability on a slippery slope. 114 "Although the court
10< Krug, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 231, (quoting Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, 2
MILLER & STARR, CAL. REAL ESTATE § 3.27 at 158 (2d ed. 1989).
105 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 57l.
106 Id.
107 Id.
lOS Id.
109 Id.
110 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 570-l.
III Id. at 564-73.
112 Id. at 57l.
113 Id. at 571 n.5.
114Id.
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makes credible policy arguments in favor of limiting the broker's exposure to claims, the court draws the line in the wrong
place.'m5 The court did not have to restrict liability solely to the
parties involved in the transaction. "'Foreseeability' and 'policy
considerations' are not determined in a vacuum, but rather depend upon the particular circumstances in which the purported
wrongful conduct occurred."116 Instead, the court could ''have
drawn a limited duty on these facts, to protect the minor children of buyers who suffer foreseeable harm when a broker fails
to disclose or inspect for defective conditions in a home.'''17 Extending a broker's duty to minor children would not put professional liability on a slippery slope. 1I6 It would concentrate the
liability on buyers and their minor children, and not nannies,
neighbors, or any other foreseeable third party.1I0
Furthermore, imposing "a duty to minor children would
not by itself lead to liability in all cases.",20 The plaintiff would
still need to go through the process of proving the other elements of negligence, like establishing the causal link between
the broker's failure to disclose and the harm the child suffered. l21 This approach would at least let the claim get to a jury.
Taking this approach would not only limit the scope of liability,
it would encourage brokers to be more diligent in their inspection and their disclosure. 122 There is no harm in creating more
incentive for the broker to do exactly what his or her job is in
the first place. Instead, the Coldwell Banker court protected
the broker, while leaving the foreseeably injured child without
a cause of action. 123
The Coldwell Banker court circumvented the wellestablished foreseeability test by declaring that it had to follow
the "clear and unambiguous language of section 2079.'''24 By
doing this, the court extinguished the foreseeability rule, which
is the most important step to determine if the broker owes a
no

Markita Cooper, Brokers and Salespersons, 27 CEB REAL PROP L REP 107

(2004).
Burger v. Pond, 273 Cal. Rptr. 709, 714 (1990).
Cooper, supra note 114 at 108.
118 [d.
119 [d.
120 [d.
121 [d.
116
117

122

123
124

[d.

[d.
Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 569.
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duty of liability to a third person. 125 With this ruling, no third
person can ever make a claim against a broker. The result is
that brokers, who previously were responsible for third persons' injuries caused by their misrepresentations, will not be
held accountable for their actions. The Coldwell Banker court
erred in destroying one of the most important factors in determining duty. The court also failed to analyze the other important factors of the balancing test. Application of the balancing
test would have brought the court to a more justifiable outcome. The following sections outline that possible result.
B.

THE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY THAT THE THIRD PARTY
SUFFERED INJURY

The degree of certainty that Marcos suffered injury can be
easily measured An environmental test of the house showed a
dangerous level of mold spores and mycotoxins. 126 The mold
exposure not only caused Marcos's illness, but also the development of his asthma.127 Although becoming ill is temporary, it
is still an injury. Further, asthma may be a lifelong affliction.
Therefore, there is an extremely high degree of certainty that
Marcos suffered injury.
C.

THE CLOSENESS OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE
BROKER'S CONDUCT AND THE INJURY SUFFERED

While the mold itself literally caused Marcos to become ill
and develop asthma, the broker arguably was the proximate
cause of the harm Marcos suffered. Had the broker disclosed to
the family the presence of dangerous mold inside the house, the
family most likely would not have purchased and thereafter
lived in the home, and Marcos would not have been injured.
Alternatively, if the mother was aware of the mold, she may
have cured the defect. Thus, if the broker disclosed the mold,
Marcos would not have suffered any injuries. The broker's
failure to disclose the harmful mold in the home has a direct

125 /(rug,
269 Cal. Rptr. at 231, (quoting 2 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL
ESTATE § 3.27 at 158 (2d ed. 1989).
126 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 567.
127 [d.
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connection to the injury suffered. Had the court applied the
balancing test, this would all have been provable at trial.
D.

THE MORAL BLAME A'ITACHED TO THE BROKER'S CONDUCT

Moral blame attaches to someone when that person's failure to conform to standards of what is right and just causes
someone harm. '28 A high degree of moral blame attaches to the
broker, since the broker was helping in the sale of a dangerous
home. But inducing someone to buy a home that has defects
and hiding them from the purchaser constitutes an even
greater amount of moral blame. By deceiving the buyer and
her minor son that the home was without defects, the broker
caused Marcos to contract asthma, an affliction that may be
with him for the rest of his life. 129 Morally, it was not right to
induce someone to buy a house that would be dangerous for her
family to live in.
E.

THE POLICY OF PREVENTING FUTURE HARM

Imposing a duty of care on the broker to the buyer's minor
children provides an excellent way to prevent future harm.
Since the broker's only concern regards injuries to the actual
buyer, the incentive to disclose latent defects is extremely low.
The incentive to disclose would be higher if the court used a
balancing test that includes children in the broker's duty.
Therefore, the broker would be likely to be more careful with
disclosure because the probability of being liable for someone's
injury is higher. In the context of defects that endanger health,
the probability is further increased by involving children because they have immature immune systems, rendering them

See PROSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, 21·23 (5'h ed. 1984).
It is extremely interesting that at no point in its opinion does the court mention the actual age of Marcos. When analyzing this case in the CEB Real Property Law
Reporter, my mentor Markita Cooper wrote, "I must also mention that at no point in
the opinion does the court tell us how old Marcos is, deeming only to describe him as
his mother's 'minor child.' 1 would imagine that if we knew Marcos' age, we would find
this decision all the more disturbing. By depersonalizing Marcos and focusing on outlying cases of potential exposure, the court uses the concept of 'no duty' to deflect attention from an unjust result." Markita Cooper, Brokers and Salespersons, 27 CEB REAL
PRoP L REP 107 (2004). If Marcos happened to be extremely young, the amount of
moral blame seemingly would be even greater.
128
129
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more vulnerable to infection. 130 If the broker owes a duty to the
children in the house, the broker is more likely to adequately
disclose defects. The more incentive a broker has to disclose
defects, the more likely dangerous homes will not be sold. This
will result in fewer injuries to innocent people living in these
defective homes. Essentially, the harm will be prevented by
sheer fear of being sued.
Furthermore, creating more incentives to provide proper
disclosure is a small price to pay to protect children like Marcos, if it is a price at all. The Coldwell Banker court opined
that expanding broker liability to all foreseeable third persons,
like Marcos, would be far out of proportion to the broker's
fault. 131 In the present case, the broker clearly failed to disclose
mold in the home. 132 Because of the mold, the buyer and her
minor son were injured. 133 Thus, expanding broker liability to
third persons in this case seems to be directly in proportion to
the broker's fault. More importantly, the main focus of this
case should be the prevention of future harm and providing an
incentive to brokers to help prevent that harm. If this case extended a broker's duty to minor children living in the home, it
would only create more incentive for brokers to disclose.13'
Making a broker actually do his or her job, and prevent future
harm at the same time, does not lead to a harsh result.

F.

THE EXTENT THAT THE TRANSACTION WAS INTENDED TO
AFFECT THE THIRD PARTY

The extent that the transaction was intended to affect the
third party was an argument analyzed by the Coldwell Banker
court and one that weighed heavily in the case. 135 The court
analyzed this element with respect to the broker-client relationship and who the intended beneficiary was. 13G The court
"'" Joel Schwartz, PhD, Air Pollution and Children's Health, 113 PEDIATRICS
1037,
1037-1043
(2004),
available
at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/contenUabstracUll314/S1I1037 (last visited
Mar. 25,2005).
131 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 57l.
132 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 567.
133 Id.
134 Cooper, supra note 116 at 108.
130 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 570-71. (Note the above four standards
were not mentioned at all in the case).
136 Id.
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mentioned that "[a]s suppliers of information in a commercial
context, the brokers' duty only extended to intended beneficiaries of the brokers' advice."I37 The court reasoned that Marcos
was not an intended beneficiary of factual disclosures regarding the value and desirability of the house purchased by his
mother, and therefore no duty extended to him.'38
The circumstances in this case differ from every other case
the court used to interpret the law regarding broker disclosure
and intended beneficiaries. 139 The court should not have analyzed this case in a vacuum. The court seemed to disregard the
fact that Marcos was the buyer's minor son, and instead
treated him as they would any third person. Instead, the court
should have analyzed the case under its own specific circumstances. Three cases were cited in the court's analysis of the
lack of broker-third party relationship in Coldwell Banker.
The first case used as persuasive authority by the Coldwell
Banker court was FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Superior Court.14I
There, the court found that a broker was not liable to partygoers injured by a defective deck on the property.142 In Coldwell
Banker, the court was dealing with the injury of a minor child
living in the purchaser's home, not with social guests.
In FSR, the benefit intended from the transaction was not
extended to social guests because they were outside the transaction. 143 This factor weighs very heavily in this context because guests are so far attenuated from the transaction, that it
would be unconscionable to extend a duty them. In contrast,
Coldwell Banker involved a minor child living in the home with
the mother/purchaser who was the prime beneficiary of the
transaction. 144 The diversity of the factual scenarios means
they can hardly be compared. The child is living in the home,
whereas social guests are only in the home temporarily to have
a good time. Furthermore, the child is under the care of the
140

137

[d. at 570, (citing FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 404

(1995».
[d.
139 See FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 404
(1995), Burger v. Pond, 273 Cal.Rptr. 709 (1990), Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745,
(1992) .
..0 [d.
IU Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 570.
142 FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 404, 406 (1995).
143 [d. at 406-07.
144 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 567.
138
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mother and dependent on her for health and well-being. Since
the child is so directly involved with the mother, it is reasonable for the minor child to be treated as a beneficiary of the
transaction as well. In contrast, social guests are most likely
adults who can care for themselves. They have no real connection to the purchaser at all. Minor children and social guests
are so distinguishable, the court should not have compared the
two.
A second case that was cited in the Coldwell Banker court's
analysis was Burger v. Pond,, 4s In Burger, the court held that a
lawyer's duty did not extend to a new wife in a divorce proceeding with an ex-wife. 14• There, plaintiff and her husband filed an
action against the husband's lawyer based upon his alleged
negligent handling of the husband's divorce from his first
wife.
As in FSR, the third party's relationship to the professional was too far attenuated for the court to extend a duty toward the third party. The facts of Burger are easily distinguishable from those of Coldwell Banker. In Burger, the new
wife had no involvement in the divorce proceeding with her
husband's ex-wife. 148 Although the proceeding may have affected her, it did so only indirectly. In contrast, Marcos was
directly affected by the transaction between his mother and the
broker. Marcos's asthma and other injuries were most likely
sustained as a direct result of the broker's failure to disclose
the dangers of mold in the home and the broker's representations that the home was in excellent condition. 149 The facts of
Burger and Coldwell Banker are so different, the court should
not have used Burger in its analysis.
A third case to be used in Coldwell Banker was Bily v. Arthur Young & CO.ISO That case involved investors who sought to
base a claim on an accountant's individual audit of a company
in which they were investing. 161 Even though the plaintiffs in
Bily had allegedly made investments in reliance on the audit
reports, the Court held that an auditor can be held liable in
general negligence only to the person or entity contracting for
l47

Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 570.
Burger v. Pond, 273 Cal.Rptr. 709, 717 (1990).
147 Burger, 273 Cal.Rptr. 709 at 712-13.
148 Burger, 273 Cal.Rptr. 709 at 714, 717.
149 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 567.
150 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 570.
un Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745,747-9 (1992).
I ..
I ..
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the auditing services.152 The plaintiffs in Bily sought recovery
for damages allegedly resulting from economic loss. 163 In contrast, Marcos suffered physical injury as opposed to mere economic loss. Further, the auditor in Bily had no duty to the investors because they were not an integral part of the transaction. On the other hand, Marcos was directly involved in the
outcome of the transaction because he lived in the house being
purchased. The policy of protecting investors from economic
loss differs greatly from the policy of protecting minor children
from physical harm. Comparing the two puts the priorities on
an equal plane, which leads to cold results like those espoused
in Coldwell Banker. The health of children should be more important then the financial woes of an investor and therefore
should not be analyzed under the same standard.
Marcos may not have been the intended beneficiary of the
transaction, but he did benefit from the transaction. Marcos
benefited from the broker convincing his mother that the property was desirable, of course, only if the property were desirable. His benefit from the transaction was his mother's knowledge of the habitability of the home. If his mother knew of the
defect, she might not have purchased the home, and Marcos
probably would not have asthma now. Without knowledge of
the true condition of the property, Marcos unwittingly fell victim to living in a dangerous home.
The court seemed so concerned about a broker's exposure
to liability, that it ignored the policy behind protecting human
health. It is understandable that the court did not want a broker to be liable to any foreseeable nonparty, because that might
include everyone connected to the buyer. However, minor children of the purchaser living in the home are vulnerable and
cannot fend for themselves in the real world. They rely on
their parents for food, clothes, shelter, and protection. They
are as much part of the parent as anything else in the world.
This is especially true in the case of minor children. Therefore,
they should be owed the same duty of care by the broker that
extends to the purchaser. This would not open up the floodgates of liability infinitely. Instead, this expansion is necessary
to further the protective purpose of the California statutes.
152
163

[d. at 767 -S.
[d. at 74S.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 6

282

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

IV. CONCLUSION

California has been the pioneer in eradicating and amending the archaic laws of real estate disclosure that have no place
in today's society.15' California's method of picking away at the
caveat emptor rule is an example of this. The ruling of this
case moves backward with respect to broker disclosure. Considering the influence California has on other states, this ruling will have a detrimental effect on the way courts will rule
across the country. As a result, children like Marcos will be
left with no recourse for their injuries.
In Coldwell Banker, instead of making an equitable decision, the court followed the strict wording of a statute and a
creative interpretation of case law to come to its ruling. Rather
than following what was right, the court turned its back on
Marcos in order to create a bright-line rule. Taking this limited approach was not the only option in this case. The court
has the power to make equitable decisions, and expand the
duty to minor children, but it chose not to in this case.
Instead of looking solely at the statute, the court should
have used the common-law balancing test to establish duty. By
following the statute, the court ruled that no duty was owed to
Marcos, and it threw the case out on summary judgment.155
The court prevented a jury from ever being able to examine
whether the broker owed a duty to a minor child. Letting the
case go to a jury would at least have allowed the child his day
in court. It would not necessarily expose brokers to unwarranted liability because all the other elements of negligence
still need to be established, particularly the causal link between the broker's failure to disclose and the harm suffered.
The balancing test is an equitable approach that considers
many factors before duty is established. It has been used in
many contexts and withstood the test of time. Instead of applying the balancing test in Coldwell Banker, the court chose a
restrictive interpretation of the statute. This restriction allowed the court to ignore the fact that the health of a minor
child had been seriously jeopardized by the negligence of a bro1M See Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963), Easton v. Strassburger, 199
Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984); see also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102-1102.15, 2079-2079.10 (West
2005).
'56 Coldwell Banker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 573.
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ker. It made an unfair application of the statute which resulted in an injured boy without a cause of action. Since the
courts are not clear on the intention of the statute, it may be
time for the Legislature to take this issue under review in order to clarify the statutory meaning of section 2079. Failure to
do so will result in many more children like Marcos being injured without redress and brokers laughing all the way to the
bank.
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